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Abstract
The transmission of ideas, information, and resources forms the core of many issues studied in
political science, including collective action, cooperation, and development. While these pro-
cesses imply dynamic connections among political actors, researchers often cannot observe
such interdependence. One example is public policy diffusion, which has long been a focus
of multiple subfields. In the American state politics context, diffusion is commonly concep-
tualized as a dyadic process whereby states adopt policies (in part) because other states have
adopted them. This implies a policy diffusion network connecting the states. Using a dataset
of 187 policies, we introduce and apply an algorithm that infers this network from persistent
diffusion patterns. The results contribute to knowledge on state policy diffusion in several
respects. Additionally, in introducing network inference to political science, we provide schol-
ars across the discipline with a general framework for empirically recovering the latent and
dynamic interdependence among political actors.
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Introduction
A central feature of political science is the dynamic interdependence among political actors.
Citizens, elites, governments, and countries all display intergroup connections because group
members repeatedly face common sets of choices. Furthermore, the decisions made by one ac-
tor in a group often influence those of the others. As a result, many critical issues that politi-
cal scientists study—such as collective action problems, international cooperation, and economic
development—are influenced by the flow of ideas, information, and resources between those con-
nected political actors. Yet while scholars are often able to observe the flow of information itself,
empirically identifying the underlying network of connections—usually the concept of chief theo-
retical interest—is more difficult, especially if that network changes over time. In this research we
introduce to the discipline a general method for inferring a dynamic network connecting political
actors based only on observable information about the repeated choices that those actors make.
The methodology we introduce is applicable to a wide range of research areas across politi-
cal science. However, to demonstrate its utility, we focus the bulk of our attention on one notable
instance of this phenomenon: the diffusion of public policies across the American states. A consid-
erable amount of scholarship documents how policies, norms, agreements, and even wars diffuse
across political boundaries. Indeed, Graham, Shipan, and Volden (2013) identify more than 800
articles from the past 50 years on diffusion processes in American politics, comparative politics,
and international relations. A central theme in all of this work is that peer governments are con-
nected to one another by their repeated policy decisions. However, observing systematic patterns
in those connections over time—who tends to lead and who tends to follow—is a difficult task. We
provide a means of doing so here by inferring a policy diffusion network based on the adoption of
many policies over time. Moreover, we demonstrate how and why this dynamic network is crucial
to understanding the diffusion process.
In what follows we demonstrate the significance of policy diffusion network inference and
analysis. We begin by grounding the concept of a diffusion network in the theoretical framework
of diffusion studies. We highlight that several scholars have suggested the existence of a diffusion
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network in theory, but never had the means of empirically measuring the ties in the network. Then
we describe our network inference methodology; recently developed in machine learning, it can
be used to infer a latent diffusion network from data consisting of binary diffusion “cascades.”
Next we apply the algorithm to infer our network of state policy diffusion. Then we illustrate how
including information from the inferred diffusion network as a covariate in well-known policy
diffusion studies improves model fit. Following that, we present an analysis of the factors that
predict the formation of diffusion ties between states. Finally, we close with a discussion of the
broad applicability of our methodology to many different research areas in political science.
Conceptualizing a Policy Diffusion Network
The institution of federalism provides an ideal environment for diffusion processes by encour-
aging member governments to compete with or learn from one another. The American states
represent an important example of such an environment (e.g., Walker 1969; Gray 1973; Berry and
Berry 1990; Shipan and Volden 2012). Indeed, the states are connected in many ways, including
shared history and culture, the exchange of goods, migration of citizens, and overlapping media
markets. A key result of these connections is that states look to each other when making policy.
Due to myriad competitive, cooperative, and imitative forces, policy innovations regularly spread
throughout the American states, and scholars have worked for decades to develop theoretical and
empirical tools to understand and evaluate the various forces that underlie diffusion episodes. This
has proven to be a difficult task because it requires conceptual and empirical separation of policy
adoption, in which a state passes a new law as a result of internal and/or external determinants,
and policy diffusion, which specifically refers to the external influence that other states exert on
adoption in the state.
The broad arc of the literature on policy diffusion has moved from an initial interest in looking
for consistent patterns of diffusion between states across multiple policies to the application of
new methodologies or measurement strategies to single-policy diffusion episodes and finally to a
renewed interest in the general patterns across policies. This return of the pendulum to detecting
persistent pathways of diffusion results from recent theoretical and methodological advancements
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that provide the impetus for reexamining the foundational questions posed at the outset.
In his pioneering study, Walker (1969) stated his primary goals as (1) determining whether a
group of policy leaders existed and, if so, (2) how policies spread from these pioneering states to
the rest of the American states. After his innovation scores provided an affirmative answer to the
first question, he moved to developing a theoretical and empirical approach for determining the
existence of “more or less stable patterns of diffusion of innovations among the American states”
(Walker 1969, 888). He theorized that these patterns would reflect both geographic proximity and
states’ locations within various national communication channels formed by associations of state
officials, organized interests, consultants, and academics. Given the limitations of the time, his
empirical analysis focused on the presence of regional groupings. He found that while regional
groupings existed, the evidence clearly pointed to additional influences that blurred these regional
distinctions.1 While subsequent work by Gray (1973) offered a number of important critiques
of Walker’s (1969) approach, it continued to conceptualize diffusion as reflective of “regional or
professional communication networks [that] may produce distinctive diffusion patterns” (1176).
While these critiques stunted the pursuit of comparing innovativeness across states, the litera-
ture continued to pursue the idea of evaluating patterns of policy diffusion. Event history analysis
(EHA), introduced for the study of policy diffusion by Berry and Berry (1990) in their analysis of
the diffusion of state lottery adoptions, has been the primary vehicle for this pursuit as it offers the
opportunity to simultaneously account for time-varying internal and external determinants of pol-
icy adoption. It addresses many of the concerns raised by Gray (1973) and others about Walker’s
(1969) innovation scores and led to the development of a robust literature on policy adoption. Dur-
ing this era, researchers almost exclusively focused on one policy at a time since that fit within the
EHA framework. Furthermore, while these researchers highlighted the role of a variety of internal
determinants of adoption, the central external determinant of interest was geographic contiguity,
which was meant to capture diffusion between neighboring states. Despite notable exceptions such
1More recent work also highlights diffusion between non-contiguous states. For example, California is considered
both a prolific policy innovator in general (Volden 2006) and a leader in energy and environmental policy specifically
(Ghanadan and Koomey 2005). New Jersey and Maryland have both recently implemented policies explicitly modeled
after energy and emissions policies in California (Nussbaum 2007; Wagner 2007).
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as Mintrom and Vergari’s (1998) study of policy entrepreneurs’ connections across states or Gross-
back, Nicholson-Crotty, and Peterson’s (2004) evaluation of ideological similarity with previous
adopters, the vast majority of studies continued to examine only contiguity. A common finding
in this work is that the probability of adoption increases as more of a state’s neighbors adopt the
policy (but see Mooney 2001).
After dominating the field for more than twenty years, single policy EHA studies began to run
their course in terms of pushing the boundaries of knowledge. Researchers responded by moving
in different directions, including a micro level approach that examines the internal legislative pro-
cesses that influence policy adoption (Karch 2007) and studying how policy characteristics affect
the overall rate of diffusion (Boushey 2010; Nicholson-Crotty 2009). Other researchers pushed
forward on studying the patterns of interstate diffusion in creative ways: the incorporation of Ge-
ographic Information Systems (GIS) to develop more nuanced measures of economic diffusion
pressures between contiguous states (Berry and Baybeck 2005), the consideration of policy adop-
tion and expansion to separate the role of economic and social learning forces behind diffusion
(Boehmke and Witmer 2004), and the examination of bottom-up or top-down diffusion between
cities, states, and the Federal government (Shipan and Volden 2006).
One of the biggest innovations during this period was the development of the dyadic EHA
approach by Volden (2006). The dyadic EHA eschews adoption as its outcome of interest and
instead considers whether a policy change by a state moves it closer to the policies of other states.
An increase in policy similarity between pairs of states serves as the dependent variable and the
dyadic structure facilitates evaluating whether a state moves its policy closer to those of other
states whose policy differs (Boehmke 2009). This allows the consideration of a variety of absolute
and relative characteristics of state dyads, including contiguity, but also ideological similarity and
policy success in states that might be emulated. This approach has been applied to health policy
in the United States (Volden 2006) as well as to unemployment policy in OECD countries (Gilardi
2010).
Studies like these have prompted a new wave of theoretical arguments to explain patterns of
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diffusion, whether through competition between states (Baybeck, Berry, and Siegel 2011), learning
and free-riding across states facing uncertainty about a policy’s value (Volden, Ting, and Carpenter
2008), or through changes in public opinion resulting from constituent learning through policy
choices in nearby states (Pacheco 2012). These theoretical advances have, in turn, resulted in new
ways to examine diffusion empirically.
Despite the major strides these and other studies have taken to further our understanding of
policy adoption, they have still done so in the context of a single policy. Even the dyadic EHA
approach usually considers policy similarity based on multiple components of a single policy. So
while the literature has made significant progress identifying the existence of diffusion pathways,
we still know relatively little about their persistence. Put differently, almost no systematic progress
has been made towards answering Walker’s (1969) second question about general patterns of policy
diffusion. While scholars have recently returned to the collection and analysis of large numbers
of policies (Nicholson-Crotty 2009; Boushey 2010; Boehmke and Skinner 2012b), they have not
yet used these databases to uncover persistent connections between states through public policy
diffusion. Yet this approach seems to be most consistent with what Walker (1969), Gray (1973),
and others had in mind at the founding of this literature.
Indeed, the patterns of policy diffusion between the American states serve as a perfect opportu-
nity for identifying the presence and structure of a dynamic, latent, policy diffusion network. The
structure of such a network has been one of the driving forces in the literature for half a century,
yet methodological and data limitations placed critical restrictions on the ability of researchers to
estimate and evaluate such a network more than one policy at a time. As we describe below, the
recent combination of technical advances and accumulation of data on the timing of adoptions for
scores of policies provides the information necessary to solve this problem.
To our knowledge the latent network that we estimate on these data provides the first empirical
measure of the full state-to-state policy diffusion network. The intuition behind the meaning of
this network, however, parallels that of the much-used contiguity network. Just as a state becomes
more likely to adopt a policy when its neighboring states have previously done so, it should be
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more likely to adopt a policy when any state to which it is connected in its general diffusion
network has already done so. After estimating this network, we therefore explore its structure in a
number of ways. First, we identify leader states and compare the structure of the network to one
specified solely by contiguity. Then we show that supplementing existing studies with information
about prior adopters in this latent network improves our ability to predict the adoption of specific
policies. We then investigate the structure of this network by evaluating the ability of theoretically
important covariates to explain diffusion ties.
Policy Diffusion Network Inference in the American States
Gomez-Rodriguez, Leskovec, and Krause (2010) consider the problem of inferring latent dif-
fusion pathways connecting units (e.g., states or countries) based on data recording the times at
which those units adopted or were infected with some attribute (e.g., a policy), over several at-
tributes. Two non-policy-adoption examples are data on when a collection of people fell ill over
several ailments or data on when news websites reported a given story over several stories. These
cascades, as they are termed, exhibit the footprint of a hidden diffusion network connecting the
units under study. Information on policy adoption for several states or countries and several poli-
cies constitutes data of this type. Here we use Gomez-Rodriguez, Leskovec, and Krause’s (2010)
latent network inference algorithm, called NetInf, to infer policy diffusion networks connecting
the American states over time.
The NetInf algorithm is derived and described in detail in the online appendix. Here we
give a broad overview of its major steps. The inferential task is the identification of a latent,
directed network (i.e., each tie has a sender and a receiver) that can be used to explain a dataset
with several cascades, where each cascade is a recording of when units (e.g., states) exhibited
some dichotomous attribute (e.g., a policy adoption). Each cascade is stylistically represented as
a tree, in which there is a branch for each diffusion instance whereby the attribute (e.g., policy)
spreads from the origin (i.e., sender) of the branch to the destination (i.e., receiver). The network
being inferred constrains the trees that can be used to construct the cascade such that only edges
in the network can be used to construct the trees. The network is tied to the set of cascades in that
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the algorithm will attempt to find edges that can be used in trees to explain many cascades. The
structure of this algorithm actually fits quite closely with Walker’s (1969) description of the ideal
way to represent state-to-state policy diffusion:
At the top of the tree would be a set of pioneering states which would be linked together
in a national system of emulation and competition. The rest of the states would be
sorted out along branches of the tree according to the pioneer, or set of pioneers, from
which they take their principal cues (Walker 1969, 893).
Here we apply NetInf to a moving window of policy adoptions on the 187 policies included
in the database introduced by Boehmke and Skinner (2012b) to infer an evolving state-to-state
policy diffusion network for the years 1960–2009.2 Before presenting our application further, we
define some useful terminology. We infer a different network in each year (t). The diffusion ties
(i.e., edges) that we infer are directed, identifying for each pair of states (i, j), whether policies
diffuse from i to j, from j to i, both, or neither. For a directed edge i→ j, which indicates that
policies diffuse from i to j, we refer to i as the source and j as a follower. Thus, if the edge i→ j
exists in the network at time t, then we say i is a source of policy for the follower j at time t.3
NetInf Overview
Now that the broad structure of the algorithm and components of our application have been
described, we present a few critical details on how edges in the diffusion network are selected
along with an illustrative example. Three main factors contribute to the likelihood that state i
2Several other data collection efforts, such as content analysis of legislative journals, model legislation, or public
records, could also be used to infer the diffusion network (e.g., Garrett and Jansa 2013). The significant advantage we
gain from NetInf is the scale and scope of policy adoption data coverage; in this case, we simply need to know the
years in which states adopted the policies. This allows us to infer the network at yearly intervals over a very long span
of time and across many policies with minimal coding rules. Indeed, we contend that NetInf can provide a great
deal of information to political scientists across the discipline even with a relatively feasible data collection effort.
3As with most research on policy diffusion, we are limited by the fact that our data comprise only successful in-
stances of the spread of policies. However, NetInf could be extended to incorporate unsuccessful or never-attempted
cases of diffusion because information on those cases—if it were available—could be put into the cascade data struc-
ture that NetInf employs for inference. The main roadblocks to this are (1) defining what constitutes an unsuccessful
attempt and (2) collecting data on those attempts over time. Research by Karch, Nicholson-Crotty, Woods, and Bow-
man (2013) begins to overcome these issues, but only for a specific set of policies that are implemented as interstate
compacts. Nonetheless, as this research grows, NetInf is well-positioned to be useful in understanding how policy
diffusion networks affect successful and unsuccessful diffusion.
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will be identified as a source for j. Collectively, these factors ensure that NetInf is picking
up patterns consistent with the definition of policy diffusion given above, rather than just chance
sequential adoption of the same policy by two states.
(1) The number of times i adopts a policy before j. NetInf uses edges it infers to explain
the individual cascades, but an edge from i to j can only be used if i adopts before j. The
number of times i adopts before j represents a ceiling on the number of times NetInf can
use an edge from i to j in a cascade-specific tree.
(2) The length of time between i’s adoptions and j’s adoptions. The wait times are parameter-
ized as exponentially distributed, which means short times are more likely than long times.
Thus, NetInf would prefer to use single edges to explain short times between adoptions,
and chains of edges to explain longer times. The degree to which NetInf prefers short to
long times is governed by the tunable exponential rate parameter used in the algorithm.
(3) The precision with which an adoption by i predicts an adoption by j. NetInf uses a
probability model in which adoption by sources is used to predict adoptions. If state i simply
adopts a lot of policies early, a result will be many i-then- j sequences, but also many policies
for which i adopts and j does not, which will penalize the probability model’s likelihood with
false positives.
NetInf iteratively adds the edge that performs the best on the three factors above, weighted
according to the underlying probability model (detailed in the online appendix). To smooth things
out, the NetInf probability model also includes a very low, but non-zero, probability that a state
will adopt a policy when one of its sources has not previously adopted (i.e., the cascade can jump
without an edge in the network). Another feature to note is that NetInf prefers non-redundancy
in forming the network. That is, if an edge has been added to the network that can be used to
explain an adoption, NetInf will prefer to add an edge that explains other adoptions that are not
yet adequately explained by existing edges.
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An Example: West Virginia, 1975–2009
We illustrate the edge ranking and selection procedure using the case of identifying sources for
West Virginia over the period 1975–2009. West Virginia adopted 39 policies over this time period.
The first step in ranking and identifying potential sources for WV is to ask which states adopted
several of those 39 policies prior to WV adopting. Among the other 49 states, the largest number
of pre-WV adoptions we observe is 17. Colorado, California, and Connecticut all adopted 17 of
the 39 policies adopted by WV before WV adopted them. This makes CO, CA, and CT strong
potential sources for WV because each could be used to explain 17 of WV’s policy adoptions. As
it turns out, all three of the edges CO→WV, CT→WV, and CA→WV are added to the diffusion
network that covers the period 1975–2009. The CO→WV edge is the 46th (out of 300) added to the
network for that period, the edge CT→WV is the 67th, and the edge CA→WV is the 112th. Note
that the number of edges identified is a tunable parameter of NetInf , so if we had asked for only
100 or 50 edges, we would have excluded the CA→WV and the CT→WV edges, respectively. We
also consider one more potential source state, Delaware, which adopted 16 policies prior to WV in
this period, but is not identified as a source for WV.
In serving as potential sources for WV, CO, CA, CT, and DE are all high relative to other
potential sources on the first point listed above: the number of i-then- j sequences. The source
quality ranking of CO>CT>CA>DE, results from their performance on the second two factors.
Figure 1 depicts the distributions of years between the three potential source states and WV’s
adoptions for the policies in which the potential sources adopt before WV. The graph shows that
WV adopted very shortly after CO in nearly all 17 instances. There were several longer lags for
CT, more longer lags for DE, and many long lags for CA (e.g., 5-10 years). Thus, CO performs
the best on criterion 2 (the length of time between i’s and j’s adoptions).
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Lastly, CO, CT, CA and DE adopted 57, 56, 68, and 53 policies, respectively, over the 1975–
2009 period. These adoption frequencies factor in on the third criterion, the precision of an adop-
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tion by i in predicting an adoption by j. Because CA adopted 18-20 percent more policies than
CO, CT, or DE, policy adoption by CA is less effective at predicting an adoption by WV than are
adoptions by CO or CT.4
To understand why DE is not identified as a source, we need to dig a bit deeper into the com-
parative pre-WV adoption timing. Recall that NetInf prefers to use edges to span short time
periods in diffusion trees. In understanding how NetInf chooses between potential sources, it
is important to consider which potential source regularly adopts prior to the follower state, and
relatively close to the follower state’s adoption. Looking at WV’s adoptions, we see that CO, CT,
CA, and DE were the most recent prior adopting states for 11, 8, 10, and 3 policies, respectively.
Because NetInf prefers to use edges for short diffusion times, DE is not a good candidate source
relative to other states.
Network Inference over Time
In order to represent variation in the network over time, we apply NetInf to a moving win-
dow of policy adoptions. There are many ways we could divide the data in order to use NetInf
to infer a different network for each year. We base our approach on how the networks and mea-
sures computed on them would likely be used in future research. We expect, and later suggest,
that scholars will use the diffusion networks in the same way they use geographic neighbors in
statistical models of the adoption of new policies. That is, statistical models will use the number of
state s’s sources that have adopted the policy prior to t to predict whether s will adopt that policy
at time t.
To avoid endogeneity in the use of the network at t to predict adoption at t, we specify our
time-varying network inference to assure that only policy adoptions prior to time t are used to
inform the structure of the diffusion network at time t. An edge from i to j at t can be interpreted
as indicating that the policy has frequently spread from i to j in the period immediately preceding
4To underscore their relative strength as sources for WV, we can consider the number of policies in which NetInf
uses each edge to explain adoptions out of the 17 instances in which each of the identified sources adopted a policy
prior to WV adopting. The edges CO→WV, CT→WV, and CA→WV are used in 17, 10, and 9 policy cascades,
respectively.
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t. This way, we can be certain that a state’s policy adoption at time t is not used, via the inferred
network, to predict that same policy adoption at time t.5
Tuning NetInf
We set three parameters in the network inference procedure. First, we need to define the number
of preceding years of adoptions that will be used to infer the network for time t. Second, we need
to define the number of edges we want to infer. Third, we need to tune the rate parameter of the
exponential distribution used by NetInf to calibrate how long it takes for policies to diffuse from
one state to another. The exponential distribution gives the distribution of diffusion times between
states, provided that there is an edge connecting them. Higher rates place a higher penalty on the
addition of edges to the network along which it takes a long time for policies to diffuse.
The procedure we use to select the values of these three parameters is fully described and illus-
trated in the online appendix. To give an overview, we use a grid search on a range of the number of
edges from 100–1,000, the time interval from 5–50 years and the exponential rate parameter from
0.125–1 (i.e., an average diffusion time of 1–8 years). We infer a new time series of networks for
each combination of tuning parameter values and evaluate the fit of an event history model, which
does not include any other state covariates, in which we use the inferred networks to predict policy
adoptions. Our process of tuning NetInf represents a combination of theoretical and data-driven
considerations. We rely upon prior theoretical expectations regarding the appropriate ranges in
which we expect to find the optimal parameter values. We use a data-driven approach to identify
the best set of parameters within these ranges. The only condition under which we would explore
a broader range of the parameters is if we found a boundary solution in the grid search (e.g., if the
best rate parameter were 0.125, corresponding to an 8 year average diffusion time).6
5There may be concern that we infer one diffusion network at each time point, which models the diffusion of all
policy adoptions within the respective time window. Indeed, some types of policies may diffuse in systematically
different patterns than do other types of policies. In the online appendix we present diagnostics to evaluate whether
there exist multiple classes of policies that systematically affect the ties inferred in the diffusion networks. We find
very strong evidence that there are not multiple classes of diffusion patterns in our dataset of policies.
6Note that future researchers might choose to fix one or more of these parameters based on theory in order to focus
on certain types of edges (e.g., fixing a high rate parameter to focus on fast diffusion or a small time interval to focus
on short-term and volatile relationships).
11
The networks that we use in the analysis that follows are those that result in the best fit over
the grid of tuning parameter values. The network that results in the best predictive fit across
all parameters is one with 300 edges and defined over 35 years of policy adoptions. Because
we evaluate the tuning parameters, including the time interval, based on the effectiveness of the
inferred ties in predicting future adoption cascades, we are not surprised to find that the best-
performing time interval is relatively long. Ties identified in relatively long time intervals will be
those that are robust to historical fluctuations in political, social and economic conditions.7 The
fit is not particularly sensitive to the rate parameter, but the network using a rate of 0.5 results in
the best fit. This value corresponds to diffusion episodes that take, on average, two years. An
average of approximately 1,900 adoption instances over an average of approximately 120 policies
is used to infer the network for each year (precise distributions of these quantities are provided in
the online appendix).
Descriptive Analysis of the Policy Diffusion Network
In this section we conduct descriptive and exploratory analyses of the network we have inferred.
First, we demonstrate that the network is quite distinct from a set of relations recording geographic
contiguity. Second, we summarize the outgoing and incoming diffusion ties of each state over
five-year periods. Third, we provide an external empirical validation of the network by comparing
it to newspaper reports of state-to-state emulation during the same time period.
Geographic Contiguity
The first descriptive feature of the diffusion network that we consider is its similarity to a net-
work of geographic contiguity relations among states. Figure 2 plots the percentage of contiguity
relations between states that are identified as diffusion ties (black line) and the percentage of in-
ferred diffusion ties that are between contiguous states (gray line). Both of these percentages hover
between ten and twenty percent between 1960 and 2009. This indicates that the overwhelming
majority of policy diffusion relations exist between states that are not geographically contiguous.
7We also use a network based on 400 edges and 10-year periods for use in two applications to policy diffusion
models because that network fits those data best (see the online appendix).
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Therefore, although geographic contiguity represents a good first start, ties between neighboring
states are not a comprehensive proxy for the policy diffusion network.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
State-Level Activity in Diffusion Pathways
Ranking states based on their innovativeness is a research problem that dates back at least to
Walker (1969). Table 1 presents the top 15 states based on the number of states to which they send
diffusion ties over five-year periods. In their time-aggregated measures of policy innovativeness,
Walker (1969) and Boehmke and Skinner (2012b) find {CA, NJ, OR, NY, CT} and {CA, NJ, IL,
NY, OR} to be the top five states, respectively. Many of these states are at the top of our list in
each five year period. Only Florida emerges as an outlier with respect to previous rankings: Walker
(1969) and Boehmke and Skinner (2012b) rank Florida as 13th and 12th, respectively, whereas we
find Florida to be in the top five for nearly every five year period, and at the top of the list for a
decade.
[Insert Table 1 here]
To venture an explanation as to why Florida emerges as an innovator in our analysis, but not
in previous studies, we present Table 2, which details how often each of the three top innovators
(New York, California, and Florida) were first adopters, and also how often the other two did not
adopt. We see from this table that, even though Florida is the least frequent first adopter among
the three, the policies for which it is the first adopter are, at a very high rate, never adopted by New
York or California. Thus, although Florida does not stand out as a notably frequent first adopter,
it is often placed at the root of cascade trees because other frequent adopters are not innovators
in policy areas led by Florida. This inference regarding Florida highlights a primary strength of
NetInf: a state will not be deemed innovative based solely on the speed with which it adopts
policies. Rather, a state is deemed innovative if its adoption serves to explain adoptions by other
states that cannot be explained with reference to other early adopters.
[Insert Table 2 here]
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Media-based Validation of the Policy Diffusion Network
We have not yet connected the diffusion ties we have inferred with any real-world instances of
state-to-state policy emulation. Given the high profile status of several areas in state law, selected
major policy decisions at the state level are afforded in-depth press coverage (Tan and Weaver
2009). As we show below, newspaper articles often indicate when a substantial portion of a state
law has been modeled after another state’s policy. We identified accounts of policy emulation
in journalistic coverage of state policymaking by searching LexisNexis Academic for newspaper
articles containing the phrase, “modeled after a/an ∗∗∗”, where “∗∗∗” was the name of a state, for
all fifty states.8 LexisNexis covers newspaper articles going back to 1981. We then counted of the
number of stories that report the emulation of each states’ policies. These documented instances
of policy emulation can serve as the basis for a qualitative validation of the inferred network. If the
news media accurately reports some (possibly biased) sample of actual policy emulation instances,
then we should observe a positive association between the number of diffusion ties sent by a state
and the number of media reports of that state being emulated by others.
Figure 3 depicts the bivariate relationship between the number of emulation stories identified
and the average number of ties sent by each state in the inferred diffusion network, averaged
over 1981–2009. On the linear scale, we find a strong correlation of r = 0.72. However, two
outliers—New York and California—have approximately twice as many emulation stories as any
other state, so we also consider the correlation on the log-scale, which produces a slightly more
moderate correlation of 0.621. Both the Pearson’s correlation coefficient and Spearman’s rank-
based correlation are statistically significant at the 0.01 level.9 The positive relationship between
emulation reports in the media and average ties sent in the inferred diffusion network indicates that
the diffusion relationships we identify align with in-depth journalistic accounts of state-to-state
8To avoid primarily nationally-oriented coverage, we excluded The New York Times, The Washington Post, USA
Today and The Los Angeles Times from this analysis (but results are not contingent on this choice).
9Our online appendix describes a regression analysis in which we estimate the effect of inferred diffusion network
ties on the number of emulation stories reported, adjusting for the total coverage of a state in LexisNexis. There is a
strong positive and statistically significant relationship between emulation stories and diffusion ties after adjusting for
total state news coverage.
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policy diffusion.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
Applying the Inferred Network to Models of Policy Diffusion
Most policy diffusion studies examine the influence of state-level features on the adoption of
new policies as well as the influence states have on one another, primarily via contiguity. Our
network of policy diffusion across the fifty states provides a novel opportunity to account for
cross-state dependencies in these studies. To that end, we incorporated the inferred policy diffusion
network into EHA models of diffusion for four separate policies: lotteries (Berry and Berry 1990),
Indian gaming (Boehmke 2005), capital punishment (Boehmke 2005), and restaurant smoking bans
(Shipan and Volden 2006). In addition to these policy-specific EHA models, we also replicated
Boehmke and Skinner’s (2012a) “pooled event history analysis” (PEHA) model fit to data on 151
different policies diffusing over the period 1960–1999 (see also Boehmke 2009).
To conserve space, we present the details of these applications of the inferred diffusion network
in the online appendix. Briefly, they yield two primary contributions to research on state policy
diffusion. First, they illustrate how the diffusion network can be integrated as a covariate in con-
ventional diffusion models. We demonstrate that doing so produces statistically and substantively
significant estimates of the effect of network ties on adoption and improves model fit. The second
contribution stems from the fact that NetInf does not condition on covariates, making it possible
that the ties inferred by NetInf arise from some underlying covariates that induce regular patterns
of policy diffusion. Our replications show that the inferred ties are not simply an artifact of the
covariates already known to influence policy adoption; rather, our diffusion network is a uniquely
important aspect of the diffusion process.10
10We validated this characteristic of NetInf with a simulation experiment in which we generated policy adoption
data based solely on state covariates. NetInf produced network estimates that were consistent with patterns in
covariate values, which indicates that consistent effects of covariates can give the appearance of diffusion ties between
states.
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Understanding the Inferred Network
Similar to other forms of latent variable (e.g., estimated legislator ideal points), the diffusion
network we have identified likely arises from a complex combination of states’ attributes and their
relationships to each other, drawing from political, economic, and geographic factors. In our final
analysis, we evaluate the structure of our inferred network through the lens of extant theoretical
expectations about the identities of leaders and followers. We do so via multilevel logit models of
source-follower ties over the period 1960–2009.
Theoretical Framework
The concepts of exploration and exploitation, referring to the processes of individual inde-
pendent innovation and interactive emulation, respectively (Lazer and Friedman 2007), lie at the
heart of social theories of problem solving and behavioral choice (see, e.g., Akers, Krohn, Lanza-
Kaduce, and Radosevich 1979; Rice, Grant, Schmitz, and Torobin 1990; Kirke 2004; Berkes 2009).
Sometimes referred to as social learning (Ellison and Fudenberg 1995; Hummon 2000), a growing
body of research addresses how networks will and should be organized to cope with uncertainty re-
garding optimal decisions (Mason and Watts 2012). The theoretical framework of policy diffusion
in the American states bears a strong resemblance to the general literature on learning in networks.
Indeed, incomplete information underpins Walker’s (1969) theory of policy diffusion and much of
the subsequent research (e.g., May 1992; Mooney 2001; Volden 2006). States do not have the time
or resources to fully evaluate all possible solutions to their pressing policy problems. Walker and
others therefore suggest that states may act according to Simon’s (1976) concept of satisficing, in
which they attempt to identify policies that will improve their lot even if they may not constitute
the optimal policy. To accomplish this, states rely on a set of heuristics to identify policies for
possible adoption. Most importantly, states will look to the actions of other states as a source of
information. These may be neighboring states, states with similar characteristics and therefore
similar policy needs, or states with more extensive resources that act as leaders by investigating
new policies.
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We draw our explanatory variables intended to capture states’ capacity to innovate and learn
from other states from among those commonly used in the literature. For example, Walker (1969)
argues that more populous, wealthier states typically have the resources and motivation to learn
about policies on their own and scholars using EHA have continued to include these variables. We
also consider legislative professionalism, which diffusion scholars have more recently used as a
measure of legislative capacity (see, e.g., Shipan and Volden 2006). Because previous EHA studies
overwhelmingly focus on monadic policy diffusion, scholars typically use these variables to test
whether greater resources lead states to adopt new polices faster. Because we seek to explain their
effect on the diffusion network, however, we have the opportunity to separate their distinct effects
on leaders and followers. If diffusion occurs according to an informational process, then states
with greater capacity will tend to be leaders since they can investigate policies on their own more
thoroughly. This also suggests that states with greater resources can also process more information
and consider policy solutions in more states simultaneously. We therefore expect that states with
greater resources are more likely to be sources, but also to identify other states as sources.
Beyond resource effects, however, we also want to capture Walker’s idea of peer states. When
identifying sources, states may look beyond the wealthiest states to states that have similar char-
acteristics and whose choices may reflect more upon their specific circumstances. The process
according to which similar nodes are more likely to form ties in a network is referred to as ho-
mophily, and is one of the most common effects found in research on social networks (Fowler,
Heaney, Nickerson, Padgett, and Sinclair 2011). The identity of peer states likely goes beyond
measures of capacity or expertise, however, so we also consider the role of factors for which sim-
ilarity may matter in and of itself. In particular, we consider similarity in terms of ideology and
racial diversity. Ideology plays a crucial role in the types of policies states seek to adopt. With in-
complete information, then, states may look to the policies adopted by ideologically similar states
rather than to those of dissimilar states since the former has a greater chance of providing a so-
lution consistent with the preferences of its citizens. A number of studies have demonstrated that
ideology influences whether a state will copy the policy adopted by another state (e.g., Grossback,
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Nicholson-Crotty, and Peterson 2004; Volden 2006; Volden, Ting, and Carpenter 2008). We also
consider the role of racial and ethnic diversity. States with more heterogeneous populations face
distinct policy challenges so we expect that states will use diversity in defining their peer network.
The most studied concept of peer states is geographic proximity. While Walker (1969) focused
largely on regional clusters of states with a small number of their members serving as leaders, more
developed theories have emerged over the years. Many focus on the role of contiguity explicitly,
whether as a source of information transmission about public opinion (Boehmke 2005; Pacheco
2012) or as a facilitator of cross-border economic activity (Berry and Baybeck 2005; Baybeck,
Berry, and Siegel 2011). While contiguity remains the workhorse variable for interstate diffusion,
we also want to leverage the fact that our network considers the relationship between all pairs of
states to examine the role of geographic proximity above and beyond contiguity. To do this we
include a measure of distance between state capitals to test whether states have a regional tendency
when determining their peers.
Modeling Strategy
In order to test for the effects of capacity and homophily on the leader-follower relationship,
we include variables corresponding to each and enter them into our model in three ways. We start
with variables on total state population and income from the Bureau of Economic Affairs, legisla-
tive professionalism (King 2000), Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson’s (1998) citizen ideology
(the revised 1960–2010 series), partisan control of state government (Klarner 2003), and racial di-
versity using Hero and Tolbert’s (1996) formula applied to Census data. For each variable, we
include its value in the potential source state to model which states tend to be emulated, its value
in the potential follower state to capture the tendency of states to identify sources, and as a relative
measure using their absolute difference (for continuous variables) or product (for the partisan con-
trol) to assess homophily. We expect that the measures of capacity have positive effects; that the
relative measures of ideology and diversity exert negative effects (since larger values correspond
to greater difference between the two states); and that shared borders and geographic proximity
have positive effects. Of course, homophily likely extends beyond ideology and diversity, so we
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also expect that the absolute difference between these variables has a negative effect. We have no
specific expectation about the role of ideology on its own in the source or follower state.
In order to evaluate these predictions, we estimate a multilevel, over-time, logit model of the
diffusion network.11 In accordance with the structure of this network, each observation corre-
sponds to whether one state considers a second state as a source. We therefore have dyadic data,
which facilitates the inclusion of characteristics of each state separately as well as their relative
characteristics. In order to account for dependence between observations we include two (non-
nested) random effects: one for each state when it is the follower, choosing its peer network, and
another when it is a potential source for other states. We also include, but do not report, a set of
fixed effects for each year.12 Finally, recall that as we noted in the previous section the NetInf
algorithm does not condition on underlying covariates. As such, anything that would predispose
two states to prefer the same policies might induce the appearance of diffusion ties among them.
Measures of partisanship and political ideology would be chief among these common exposures
when it comes to policymaking, which suggests some initial caution in interpreting these results.
Results
We report the results of this estimation in Table 3. Overall, they indicate the importance of
capacity, political homophily, and geographic proximity. The results for capacity stand out as espe-
cially strong, with more populous states more likely to serve as sources and to identify other states
as sources and larger and wealthier states to identify other states as sources. Further, we find strong
evidence of homophily, with larger absolute differences between states decreasing the probability
11At this point we emphasize how our analysis departs from Volden’s (2006) approach, because of important over-
laps. The dependent variable that Volden (2006) uses is whether a state A moves policy in the direction of state B’s
policy at time t, for all combinations of A, B, and t. This approach identifies policy specific emulation of B by A. Of
course, if several states have the same policy as B, Volden’s approach cannot determine which state A is emulating.
In contrast, NetInf searches for a network of edges that represent regular diffusion pathways over many policies,
meaning that our approach is capable of identifying the state(s) that A persistently emulates. However, our approach is
not capable of identifying policy-specific diffusion ties between states—only ties that manifest consistently over many
policies.
12Network data may exhibit more complex dependencies than directed vertex random effects (Cranmer and Des-
marais 2011). As such, we used quadratic assignment procedure (QAP, see Krackardt 1987)—a permutation testing
method designed for network data—to replicate the hypothesis tests presented in Table 3. The QAP was run for 500
iterations. We use the variant of QAP in which the rows and columns of the adjacency-matrix-valued dependent
variable are permuted.
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of each state choosing the other as a source. Interestingly, though, legislative professionalism does
not conform to this pattern. The effects for sources and followers are not statistically significant
and the difference term has a positive effect—indicating heterophily—which is only significant ac-
cording to the parametric p-values, indicating that states rely more on states with different values
of professionalism.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Citizen ideology also produces results consistent with expectations. In particular, ideological
distance has a negative and significant effect, demonstrating strong ideological homophily in dif-
fusion. We also find that more liberal states have fewer sources and serve as sources less often.
Analogous results obtain based on government control: unified Democratic states identify similar
states as sources more often than states with divided government, but the effect is only statistically
significant according to the parametric p-values. No effects emerge among unified Republican
states.
In order to substantively interpret these coefficient estimates, we present a series of graphs that
translates them into expected probabilities of source-follower ties. We first examine the homophily
effects in Figure 4. To calculate these probabilities we set every continuous variable at its mean
value and every dichotomous variable at its modal value in 1985. We set the estimated random
effects at their mean of zero. We then present partial effects for each set of variables: one changing
just the value in the state seeking sources, one changing the value in potential sources, and one
changing the absolute difference between them.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
Consider first the top left graph for the effects of ideology. The baseline condition involves
citizen ideology at its mean value, represented by the vertical line. Moving ideology in a potential
follower decreases the probability of identifying sources when the state becomes more liberal and
increases it when the state becomes more conservative. A similar result occurs for the ideology
of potential source states: more liberal states get chosen less often and more conservative states
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more often. Of course, both of these manipulations also increase ideological distance, which has
a negative effect on source selection. The combined effect of making the potential source more
liberal leads to an even greater decrease than either alone whereas making it more conservative
leads to a less severe decrease. In terms of magnitude, the effects range from zero to about 30%
relative to the baseline probability of about 15%.
The other graphs show similar patterns for per capita income, population, and minority diver-
sity. The magnitudes do differ quite a bit, with population showing very large effects for a handful
of large states and diversity producing a relatively small effect (note that the scales of the graphs
differ to enhance readability). Interestingly, across all five plots, the follower state effect generally
appears largest in magnitude, the homophily effect typically lies in the middle, and the poten-
tial source state effect is the smallest. Consistent with the individual coefficients, the results for
legislative professionalism do not fit our expectations. While generally insignificant and small in
magnitude, we find these results puzzling and hope to explore them in future work. One possible
explanation rests in the high correlation of professionalism with population (0.72 in our sample).
We present the results for the other variables in Figure 5. Unified government control has
a small effect, generally less than one or two percentage points. The biggest effects occur for
same unified governments, with Democratic states most likely to choose other Democratic states
as sources, but Republican states less likely to choose other Republican states. The bottom graph
shows the effect of geographic distance and contiguity. Increasing distance by a thousand miles
leads to an approximately two and a half percentage point drop in the probability of choosing a
state as a source whereas contiguity leads to a minuscule change once we account for distance—
the small capped bar at the minimum of 40 miles represents the estimated additional effect of
contiguity.
[Insert Figure 5 here]
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Network Inference in Political Science
This research makes several substantive contributions to the literature on public policy diffusion
in the American states. However, the network inference methodology is sufficiently general that it
has the potential to impact several other research areas in political science. The obvious domain
in which NetInf is applicable is the literature on policy diffusion at the national level. Graham,
Shipan, and Volden (2013) report that from 1958–2008, major political science journals published
307 policy diffusion articles in comparative politics and 226 in international relations (as well as
189 in American politics). However, political scientists also study many other phenomena that
are comprised of a fixed set of actors (e.g., citizens, legislators, countries) who make repeated
sequential decisions. NetInfwould be fruitfully applied in these domains to infer the connections
between these actors.
Consider the study of international agreements and organizations. Shared affiliations in these
institutions have been used as a proxy for ties between countries (e.g., Dorussen and Ward 2008).
This measure has drawn criticism due to the largely static nature of membership in these institu-
tions. As Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery (2009) point out, “[a]lthough mutual member-
ship in international institutions may lead to more opportunities for mutual interaction. . . it does
not necessarily lead to positive ties, as is often assumed in international relations. . . . [M]embership
may offer a static view of world politics” (578–579). NetInf could solve this problem by con-
structing a dynamic network based on countries’ repeated decisions to join intergovernmental or-
ganizations, trade agreements, and/or other international institutions (i.e., the cascades through
which affiliations spread across countries).
Another possible use for NetInf is to infer connections among legislators. In American
politics, a long tradition of work examines legislative “cue-taking,” or the process by which legis-
lators look to other members in making voting and cosponsorship decisions (e.g., Kingdon 1973;
Matthews and Stimson 1975). Network analysis has recently been employed to study legisla-
tors’ interactions in the American (Tam Cho and Fowler 2010) and cross-national (Ringe, Victor,
and Gross 2013) contexts. However, a common means of understanding how cue-taking oper-
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ates is through the use of legislator characteristics as covariates in regression models (e.g., Box-
Steffensmeier, Arnold, and Zorn 1997). This is a useful approach, but due to the lack of a tie
measurement method, it necessarily conflates sequence with cue-taking. NetInf could solve this
problem. Indeed, NetInf has recently been applied to data on cosponsorship in the U.S. Senate
with the aim of identifying the Senate influence network (Denny 2014).
Finally, political scientists and communication scholars are interested in intermedia agenda
setting, or how media outlets interact through picking up stories from one another (e.g., Golan
2006; Denham 2014). NetInf has the potential to infer a network of media outlet influence,
which could be useful for studies that examine the media’s impact on public attention to issues.
Specifically, it could help scholars understand which outlets, news mediums, or people are most
influential in setting the news agenda (e.g., Neuman, Guggenheim, Jang, and Bae 2014). In fact,
the example that Gomez-Rodriguez, Leskovec, and Krause (2010) use to introduce NetInf is the
cascading of news articles among online media outlets over a one-year period.
Network inference has the potential to impact many areas across political science. Many impor-
tant political phenomena are driven by patterns of influence and emulation. Thus, political science
routinely confronts the fact that the individual decisions of a collection of actors affect, and are
affected by, other actors. NetInf is a useful means of dynamically measuring these relationships.
Conclusions
A half-century of research has examined the causes and consequences of policies diffusing
across national and subnational boundaries. However, until now scholars have not had an ideal
means of measuring the precise patterns though which policies diffuse. Geographic contiguity
is one important factor, but does not capture the complete network of policy diffusion. In this
research, we introduce a network inference methodology to political science and use it to infer a
policy diffusion network connecting the American states.
We offer three broad contributions to the state politics literature. First, in contrast to common
assumptions in research on state policy diffusion, we find that the overwhelming majority of dif-
fusion ties connects states that are not geographic neighbors. Second, we show that the policy
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diffusion network we infer can improve explanatory models of policy adoption within specific pol-
icy areas. Our replications of previously published diffusion models indicate that when sources in
a state’s policy diffusion network adopt a policy, the likelihood of adoption significantly increases
by a comparable amount to adoption by contiguous neighbors. Third, we present empirical models
of the ties in the inferred networks to evaluate a number of theoretical perspectives on diffusion.
Perhaps most interestingly, the results highlight the role of internal capacity and pairwise similar-
ity, which tend to dominate. States with greater resources tend to have more peers, but all states
favor other states that share similar demographic and political features. We also find evidence of
leadership, with larger and wealthier states more often chosen as sources. While we have focused
on extant theories, we hope that the availability of our estimates and future applications of NetInf
provide the impetus to test existing and develop new theories of interstate policy diffusion.
The current research opens the door to several future directions in methodology and state policy
diffusion research. First, and chief among them, is extending the NetInf algorithm to simultane-
ously infer covariate-based commonalities in policy adoptions as well as the underlying diffusion
network. This would present the opportunity to precisely differentiate between diffusion ties and
patterns that are attributable to covariates. A second worthwhile extension of NetInf would be
to incorporate whether policy innovations succeed or fail by some metric, which would allow us to
evaluate the degree to which diffusion depends upon the result of the innovation. Third, our tracing
of diffusion accounts in LexisNexis is rather limited, but demonstrates the feasibility of defining
diffusion networks through the analysis of textual sources. Finally, though our work utilizes what
is, to our knowledge, the most comprehensive database of state policy adoptions currently avail-
able, there are many more policies that could be traced through the states. An expanded policy
database would permit fine-grained inference of policy-specific diffusion networks connecting the
states and the chance to identify different structures by policy type.
A final contribution of this research is the introduction of the NetInf technology to political
science. While we illustrate its applicability in the context of state policy diffusion, it has broad
potential for research in American politics, comparative politics, and international relations. The
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discipline often studies political actors who repeatedly face the same choices and make them in
sequence. This means that interdependence between actors and the emergence of leaders and
followers are likely to influence the processes under study. NetInf helps to empirically recover
this interdependence so that researchers can better understand its causes and consequences.
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Figure 1: Pre-WV Adoption Times, 1975–2009
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Note: Each box plot gives the distribution of time lags (in years) between the adoptions of the state
listed on the x-axis and WV’s adoptions for all policies that the state adopted prior to WV.
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Figure 2: Comparison of Diffusion Relations with Geographic Contiguity
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Note: The graph presents the percentage of contiguity relations between states that are identified as
diffusion ties and the percentage of inferred diffusion ties that are between contiguous states.
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Figure 3: Association Between Inferred Diffusion Ties and Media Reports of Emulation
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Note: Both axes are on the natural log scale. Because New York and California are large positive
outliers on the linear scale, the correlation is computed on the natural log scale. The correlation on the
linear scale is 0.72. The line depicts a loess regression fit.
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Figure 4: Estimated Substantive Effects of Absolute Difference Variables
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Note: The graphs present the effects of each variable on the probability scale using Model 2’s estimates.
All other variables are set to their mean (continuous variables) or mode (binary variables) in 1985 and
the random effects are set to zero.
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Figure 5: Estimated Substantive Effects of Selected Variables
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Note: The graphs present the effects of each variable on the probability scale using Model 2’s estimates.
All other variables are set to their mean (continuous variables) or mode (binary variables) in 1985 and
the random effects are set to zero.
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Table 1: Top 15 States Based on the Total Number of Diffusion Ties Sent to Other States within
Five-Year Periods
Rank 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80–84 85–89 90–94 95–99 00–04 05–09
1 NY NY NY NY NY FL FL CA CA CA
2 KY KY FL FL FL NY NY CT CT CT
3 CA SC CO NJ NJ CA CA NJ FL NJ
4 MN AL RI MN MN MN CT FL WA FL
5 AL CO CT OR RI OR OR NY NJ WA
6 SC NM MN IL OR NJ MN MN IL IL
7 RI MN MI CO CO RI NJ OR MN MN
8 MI OH NJ AK CA CT CO WA AZ AZ
9 VT NJ NE NH AK AK OH LA IA LA
10 NJ WA PA RI IL IL RI CO NC IA
11 IL MI LA AR LA CO IL IA OR OH
12 WA RI AL CT MI ID AK AZ CO NC
13 MD MD OR MI CT MI LA NC HI CO
14 OH PA MD DE ID OH MI OH LA WI
15 MS VT AR MS PA KS ID ID OH UT
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Table 2: Top Innovators from the Inferred Diffusion Network
FL NY CA First Adopter
FL – 7 5 13
NY 7 – 3 18
CA 6 14 – 24
Note: The entry in row i, column j of the state
× state elements of this table gives the number
of policies for which state i was the first adopter
and state j never adopted. The last column gives
the total number of policies for which state i was
the first adopter.
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Table 3: Multilevel Logit Models of State Policy Diffusion Ties
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Follower State Characteristics:
Citizen Ideology −0.013∗ (0.002)
Legislative Professionalism −0.373 (0.240)
Minority Diversity 0.804+ (0.236)
Per Capita Income 0.692+ (0.094)
Population 0.168∗ (0.011)
Unified Democratic Government 0.004 (0.034)
Unified Republican Government −0.025 (0.041)
Potential Source Characteristics:
Citizen Ideology −0.003∗ (0.001)
Legislative Professionalism −0.110 (0.216)
Minority Diversity −0.091 (0.182)
Per Capita Income 0.104 (0.074)
Population 0.037∗ (0.008)
Unified Democratic Government −0.054 (0.034)
Unified Republican Government −0.068 (0.039)
Relative Follower/Source Characteristics:
Contiguous 0.152∗ (0.039) 0.048 (0.040)
Distance −0.234∗ (0.019) −0.201∗ (0.020)
Citizen Ideology (Absolute Difference) −0.009∗ (0.001)
Legislative Professionalism (Absolute Difference) 0.315+ (0.139)
Minority Diversity (Absolute Difference) −0.084 (0.107)
Per Capita Income (Absolute Difference) −0.445∗ (0.048)
Population (Absolute Difference) −0.033∗ (0.004)
Unified Democratic (Product) 0.124+ (0.046)
Unified Republican (Product) −0.080 (0.082)
Constant −1.922∗ (0.137) −2.481+ (0.230)
σu1 (Follower Random Effect) 0.799 0.826
σu2 (Potential Source Random Effect) 0.204 0.214
N 122,500 94,080
Note: Observations are dyadic. The dependent variable indicates whether potential source state is a source for a
follower state in a given year. We use the network with 300 edges over 35 years of policy adoptions. Multilevel
logit coefficients are reported with standard errors in parentheses. + indicates statistical significance at the 0.05
level (two-tailed) according to just the parametric p-values from the multilevel logit. ∗ indicates statistical signif-
icance at the 0.05 level according to the QAP p-values and the parametric p-values. QAP p-values derived from
500 network permutations.
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Latent Network Inference
The derivation of the NetInf algorithm begins with the definition of a probabilistic model
describing how attributes would cascade through a diffusion network. To clarify application to state
policy diffusion, we refer to the units and attributes in the model as states and policies, respectively.
Denote a single policy cascade—the years in which states adopted a given policy—as c. The
model is derived in three steps. First, we construct the probability that state u spreads a policy
to state v: Pc(u,v). Second, given these dyadic spread probabilities, we build the probability that
a policy spreads through the states in a given tree pattern P(c|T ), where T specifies which states
influence which other states. Third, we define P(c|G), which is the probability of cascade c given
the diffusion network (i.e., graph) connecting the states G. With these three quantities defined,
we can define a proper likelihood of the policy cascades given a proposed diffusion network by
evaluating the probability of each cascade on that diffusion network.
The NetInf algorithm assumes that diffusion occurs in continuous time and that diffusion
∗Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Massachusetts–Amherst, 420 Thompson Hall,
200 Hicks Way, Amherst, MA 01003, desmarais@polsci.umass.edu.
†Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Colorado Boulder, 136 Ketchum, UCB 333,
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‡Professor, Department of Political Science, and Director of the Social Science Program in the Public Policy
Center, University of Iowa, 341 Schaeffer Hall, Iowa City, IA 52242, frederick-boehmke@uiowa.edu.
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time has an exponential distribution. If state u adopts a policy at time tu and state v adopts a policy
at time tv (tv ≥ tu) and u spreads the policy to v, then the probability of the diffusion time (tv− tu)
is given by
Pc(u,v) = λ exp
(−(tv− tu)
λ
)
, (A.1)
where λ is the rate parameter of the exponential distribution. Given this, the probability of ob-
serving a cascade that propagates in a given pattern over the states, represented by the tree T that
encodes (i, j) pairs listing which states were influenced by which other states, is
P(c|T ) = ∏
(i, j)∈T
Pc(i, j). (A.2)
The diffusion network G places a constraint on the possible tree structures T along which the
policy can spread. That is, a policy cannot spread from i to j if there is not a diffusion pathway
from i to j in G. Thus, to build the probability of a cascade c given the diffusion network G, we
average the probability of the cascade c over all possible tree structures in G, denoted T (G).
P(c|G) = 1|T (G)| ∑T∈T (G)
P(c|T ), (A.3)
where |T (G)| is the number of tree structures that can be constructed from G. Given a set of
policy cascades (C), the likelihood of the cascade data given a proposed diffusion network G is:
P(C|G) =∏
c∈C
P(c|G). (A.4)
Inferring the Network
With the probabilistic model of diffusion along a diffusion network defined, the task of inferring
a diffusion network is to find a network structure G under which we would have been highly likely
to observe the set of policy cascades C. Ideally, we would identify the network structure that
maximized the likelihood of observingC. Likelihood maximization in this case, however, turns out
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to be a computationally intractable task. Among the 50 states, there are 2×21225 possible network
structures. Moreover, Gomez-Rodriguez, Leskovec, and Krause (2010) show that every network
structure would need to be evaluated to assure that the optimal network had been identified.
As a more computationally tractable alternative, Gomez-Rodriguez, Leskovec, and Krause
(2010) derive an approach to approximation of the optimal G. They also demonstrate analytically
and through simulations that this method is capable of inferring a very-close-to-optimal network
structure inference within feasible compute times. Their departures from exhaustive optimization
are two. First, instead of computing the likelihood of a cascade given a network structure by enu-
merating all possible propagation trees represented by that network structure, they simply focus
on the most likely propagation tree for each cascade within a given network structure—a shortcut
which they refer to as lazy evaluation. Second, they adopt a greedy (i.e., local) optimization ap-
proach that iteratively adds diffusion ties to the network structure G such that the kth diffusion tie
added to the network improves the likelihood function more than any other tie that could be added
to the network, given the k−1 ties already in the network.
Network Inference: Empirical Conditions
In this section we present ancillary information regarding the application of NetInf to the
state policy diffusion data. Specifically, we present the complete model fit results from our tuning
exercise as well as descriptive data regarding the number of policies and adoption instances used
to draw inferences in each year.
NetInf Parameter Tuning
We set three parameters in the network inference procedure. First, we need to define the number
of preceding years of adoptions (denoted k) that will be used to infer the network for time t. Second,
we need to define the number of edges (E) we want to infer in each time period. Third, we need
to tune a rate parameter λ of the exponential distribution used by NetInf to calibrate how long it
takes for policies to diffuse from one state to another. A policy can only diffuse from i to j if there
is an edge from i to j in the inferred network. The exponential distribution gives the distribution
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of diffusion times between states, provided that there is an edge connecting them. Higher rates
place a higher penalty on the addition of edges to the network along which it takes a long time for
policies to diffuse. This prevents any given adoption by one state that happens to fall later in time
than adoption by another state from contributing to the formation of a tie between the two states.
We take a data-driven approach to finding optimal values of these parameters. We use the
conventional discrete-time event history modeling methodology to evaluate the performance of
the network in predicting future adoptions measured at different parameterizations. For each
unique combination of parameters {k,E,λ}, we fit a pooled (across all policies in the data) logistic
discrete-time event history model predicting policy adoption. The model contains three classes of
regressors. For state s still in the data at time t for policy p, the regressors are:
(1) States Adopting: The number of other states that have adopted by time t−1,
(2) Sources Adopting: In a network inferred on all adoptions between t−k and t−1, the number
of s’s sources in the network that have adopted p.
(3) Policy Area: An indicator variable that models the unique rate of adoption for each policy.
In this design, all of the adoptions used to infer the network used to predict adoptions at time
t occurred prior to t. We use a simple grid search to find best-fitting values of {k,E,λ}. We
search over λ ∈ {0.125,0.25,0.5,1}, which corresponds to mean diffusion times of 8, 4, 2, and
1 years, respectively, k ∈ {5,10, . . . ,50}, and E ∈ {100,200, . . . ,1000}. We use the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC) to evaluate the fit of each combination of parameters and search for
the combination of parameters that best fits the data (i.e., results in the lowest BIC). Figure A.1
depicts the BIC values for all of the parameter combinations that we consider.
[Insert Figure A.1 here]
The network that results in the best predictive fit, across all values of λ is one with 300 edges
and defined over 35 years of policy adoptions.1 The fit is not particularly sensitive to the rate
1We also use a network based on 400 edges and 10-year periods for use in two applications to policy diffusion
models (see below).
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parameter, but the network using a rate of 0.5 results in the best fit. This means that policies
diffuse, on average, in two years. An average of approximately 1,900 adoption instances over an
average of approximately 120 policies is used to infer the network for each year.
Policies and Adoptions Used in NetInf Over Time
Figure A.2 gives the number of unique policies and the total number of adoption instances used
to infer the diffusion network in each year. The network inferred toward the end of the time series
is generally based on more data than the network earlier on in the series.
[Insert Figure A.2 here]
Checking for Heterogeneity in Diffusion Classes
As the heterogeneity in the results from models of policy diffusion in the state politics litera-
ture suggests, there is considerable variation in the processes that drive the diffusion of different
policies. It is therefore important to check whether we are inappropriately pooling policies to infer
a single diffusion network. Though we know that policies vary in terms of the patterns and pre-
dictors of diffusion, we must evaluate whether this variation is policy-specific and idiosyncratic
with respect to the underlying diffusion network, or whether there are systematic and consistent
cross-policy differences. In other words, we need to check whether there are different classes of
policies in terms of the underlying diffusion network.
We use a probabilistic mixture modeling approach (Imai and Tingley 2012) to examine whether
there are multiple classes of policies in terms of their effects on the inferred diffusion network. We
iteratively remove each policy from the dataset and infer a new network with 300 edges that spans
the entire time period in our data. For each policy, we have a network inferred without that policy
included. If two (or more) policies affect the diffusion network in the same way, the inferred net-
work should change in systematically similar ways when those two policies are removed from the
dataset. Using a policies×potential edges—187×2,450—observation dataset, we fit a Bernoulli
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mixture model with the likelihood
l(y,α,pi) =
50
∏
i=1
∏
j 6=i
187
∏
p=1
k
∑
a=1
αappi
yi jp
i ja (1−pii ja)(1−yi jp),
where yi jp is an indicator of whether there is a diffusion tie from i to j when policy p is removed
from the dataset, k is the number of classes (i.e., mixture components) included in the model, αap
is the probability that policy p is a member of class a, and pii ja is the probability that there is an
edge from i to j in networks inferred excluding policies in class a.
We estimate models with k ∈ {1,2, . . . ,15}. The R package flexmix (Leisch 2004) is used
to fit the models. Estimation also requires an initial assignment of the component membership
probability for each policy. We use k-means clustering to identify initial cluster memberships,
then assign the component membership cluster probability for each policy according to α0ap =
λ 1(cp=a)
∑ki=1 λ
1(cp=i) , where cp is the initial cluster assignment of policy p and λ is a weight that controls the
entropy in the initial component assignment probabilities, with higher values of λ corresponding
to lower entropy. We evaluate models with 10 values of λ , varied equally between 1 and 5. The
model fit results of the mixture modeling are presented in Figure A.3. Following Fraley and Raftery
(1998), we evaluate the fit of each model using the BIC.
[Insert Figure A.3 here]
Across all values of λ , the best fitting model is clearly the one with only one component. This
indicates that, insofar as removing individual policies changes the results of the network inference,
the network is changed in ways that are idiosyncratic with respect to the other policies. In other
words, policies do not appear to affect the network in patterns that can be efficiently grouped into
a discrete number of classes, aside from the overall patterns that cut across all policies. These
results support our use of a single diffusion network to model the diffusion patterns across all of
the policies in our dataset.
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Adjusting for Total State Coverage in the LexisNexis Analysis
In Table A.1, we present ordinary least squares regression results in which we regress the
number of emulation stories identified in LexisNexis on the mean number of diffusion ties sent
in the diffusion networks and the total number of search hits of a state’s name in LexisNexis
Academic. This analysis adjusts for the influence of overall state coverage on the number of
reported diffusion ties.
[Insert Table A.1 here]
Table A.2 reports the news outlets in which we identify emulation stories from the LexisNexis
database.
[Insert Table A.2 here]
Applying the Inferred Network to Models of Policy Diffusion
Here we present our replications of the five policy diffusion EHA models. Recall from the main
text that we replicated four policy-specific models: lotteries (Berry and Berry 1990), Indian gam-
ing (Boehmke 2005), capital punishment (Boehmke 2005), and restaurant smoking bans (Shipan
and Volden 2006).2 We also replicated Boehmke and Skinner’s (2012) “pooled event history anal-
ysis” (PEHA) model fit to data on 151 different policies diffusing over the period 1960–1999 (see
also Boehmke 2009). This approach stacks the data from different policies and estimates a uni-
fied model with a common set of independent variables (including state, year, and policy fixed
effects). Pooling the data does result in fewer independent variables than for any single policy,
but it provides insight into what factors affect diffusion most broadly across the issue spectrum of
American politics. We show below that information from our inferred diffusion network is one of
those factors.
2Specifically, we replicate the following models: Berry and Berry (1990, 409), Table 1, model 1; Boehmke (2005,
85 and 89), Tables 4.2 and 4.4; Shipan and Volden (2006, 839), Table 3, model 9.
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Model Details
We focus on these five models for several reasons. First, the four policy-specific models rep-
resent a wide variety of policies, and the pooled model represents an even wider range. Thus, we
examine whether the diffusion network has a broad or narrow impact on adoption. Second, the
original studies presenting the policy-specific models are well-known in the policy diffusion liter-
ature, having each garnered at least 60 citations according to Google Scholar.3 Finally, the models
all use similar EHA empirical specifications, enhancing comparability. The dependent variable in
each is coded “1” if a state adopted the policy in a given year and “0” otherwise, with states that
have already adopted dropping out of the data beginning in the year after adoption.4
The theories underlying our replication models each have their own unique characteristics. To
conserve space, we refer readers to the original studies for detailed discussions of each. We focus
here on comparing the effect of the diffusion network on adoption to that of a factor that con-
sistently appears in these models: geographic contiguity. Nearly all studies of policy diffusion
include in their models either the number of or percentage of neighboring states that have previ-
ously adopted the policy. The expectation for this variable is that, due to economic competition
and/or policy learning, as more neighbors adopt, the probability of a state adopting increases (see,
for example, Berry and Berry 1990, 403–404; Boehmke 2005, chapter 4; Shipan and Volden 2006,
828).
It is unlikely that states can only compete with and learn from states with whom they share a
border. Indeed, Berry and Berry (1990) point out that there are many plausible means of state-
to-state influence, including shared borders, a shared region, or even shared culture. They further
suggest that it would be useful to have a measure of which states a state tends to “follow” in
policy adoption. With information on “predesignated leader states” in regions, the authors “would
hypothesize that a state’s probability of adopting a lottery increases after one or more states with a
3In fact, Berry and Berry (1990) is included on the “high impact” list of most influential articles appearing in the
American Political Science Review (Sigelman 2006).
4The Berry and Berry (1990) and Boehmke (2005) models are estimated with probit and the Shipan and Volden
(2006) and Boehmke and Skinner (2012) models are estimated with logistic regression.
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reputation as a leader within its region adopt it” (Berry and Berry 1990, 403). However, they also
acknowledge that they have no means of measuring this concept because there are no “reliable data
about which states are perceived. . . to be regional leaders in a policy area” (Berry and Berry 1990,
403).
Including Network Information
Our inferred policy diffusion network provides those data that previous scholars of policy dif-
fusion have not had available. In fact, beyond simply measuring regional leaders, the network gives
information on any state that tends to be a leader, or source, of policy innovation for another state.
In our replications we incorporate information from the estimated diffusion network by creating
a variable on the same scale as Neighbors Adopting: the number of a state’s sources in a given
year that previously adopted the policy. We use the inferred network to produce a list of states
that influence the state in a specified time period immediately preceding a given year.5 This list
represents all of that state’s sources at that time. Next, to create the variable Sources Adopting we
count the number of states from that list that have previously adopted the policy. We also computed
this measure as a percentage, similar to studies that compute the percentage of Neighbors Adopting
(e.g., Shipan and Volden 2006). We present both sets of results below (our substantive conclusions
do not change).
After creating the Sources Adopting variable, we then add it to each of the five replication
models. Recall that we avoid endogeneity problems because we only use adoptions that occurred
before a given year to measure the network for that year. As such, the adoption of policy j by state
i at time t cannot inform the network used in the diffusion models to predict the adoption of policy
j by state i at time t. The adoptions used in the network for time t occur prior to t.6
5As mentioned above, we constructed a version using 35-year periods and one with 10-year periods. Results
between the two are generally very similar. For each model we used the version that produced the lowest AIC and
BIC values (35-year version for the lotteries, capital punishment, and pooled models; 10-year version for the Indian
gaming and smoking ban models).
6We include all policies in the construction of the network used to produce Sources Adopting, including the policy
of interest in the EHA model. We also estimated the models after having removed the policy area of interest and found
results that are virtually identical to what we present below.
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Estimates and Model Fit
We first examine the extent to which the inclusion of Sources Adopting—instead of or in ad-
dition to Neighbors Adopting—improves model fit.7 Table A.3 reports coefficient estimates and
standard errors for the two variables as well as model fit statistics for three specifications: (1)
the original model with Neighbors Adopting (plus the authors’ other covariates), (2) a model with
Sources Adopting substituted for Neighbors Adopting (plus the other covariates), and (3) a model
with both Neighbors Adopting and Sources Adopting (plus the other covariates). In all cases the
coefficients are positive (as expected), though statistical significance varies somewhat across spec-
ifications and replications. We assess the substantive impact of these effects in section .
[Insert Table A.3 here]
To compare model fit we compute AIC, BIC, and cross-validated percent correctly classified.
We compute this last measure via leave-one-out cross-validation, which involves iteratively drop-
ping one observation, estimating the model, computing an expected probability from that model
for the left-out observation, then generating a predicted value of the dependent variable based on
a single draw from the Bernoulli distribution with that expected probability. We then compute
the percentage of the observations for which the prediction matches the actual dependent variable
value. Thus, unlike information-based measures of fit such as AIC and BIC, this measure assesses
each specification’s capacity to make out-of-sample predictions. In Table A.3, the values in bold
indicate the best-fitting model according to each statistic.
The AIC and BIC values support the inclusion of Sources Adopting in all but the restaurant
smoking ban model, where the original model and the model with Sources Adopting produce AIC
and BIC values within 2 units of each other, indicating equal fit. The cross-validated percent cor-
rectly classified measure also generally supports the inclusion of Sources Adopting. In four of the
five replication models the percent correctly classified in one or both models with Sources Adopting
increases from the original model with Neighbors Adopting (the restaurant smoking ban model is
7The question of whether Sources Adopting should replace or complement Neighbors Adopting is context-
dependent. We focus on model fit here, but theoretical expectations should also be an important guide.
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again the lone exception). These improvements are somewhat small in magnitude—ranging from
+1 to +3 percentage points across the different models. Nonetheless, they consistently point to
the models that include Sources Adopting in the specification as the best fit.
Overall, Table A.3 provides good evidence that Sources Adopting can improve the fit of policy
diffusion EHA models, either in place of or in addition to Neighbors Adopting. Importantly, across
the five models, none of the fit statistics decisively selects the original model with Neighbors
Adopting as the better fit. Given this evidence that Sources Adopting is a useful addition to diffusion
models, our next step is to examine its substantive impact on policy adoption.
Marginal Effects
We examine the substantive implications of including Sources Adopting in Figure A.4 by graph-
ing the average marginal effects of Neighbors Adopting (top row) and Sources Adopting (bottom
row) in each model on the probability scale.8 All estimates are computed from the specifications
that include either Neighbors Adopting or Sources Adopting.9
[Insert Figure A.4 here]
The first point to note from Figure A.4 is the effect of the count of Neighbors Adopting (lotter-
ies, Indian gaming, capital punishment, and pooled model) and percentage of Neighbors Adopting
(restaurant smoking bans) is positive. Consistent with the expectation that states react to economic
competition and/or policy learning, more neighboring states with the policy corresponds with an
increase in the probability of adoption. The magnitude and level of uncertainty varies somewhat
across the models, but the effect is consistently in the positive direction.
Moving to the bottom row of Figure A.4, note that when substituted for Neighbors Adopting,
the effect of Sources Adopting is also positive in all five models; as the number of sources adopting
the policy increases, so too does probability of a state adopting the policy. From the minimum (0)
to the maximum (lotteries: 7, Indian gaming: 10, capital punishment: 10, restaurant smoking bans:
8We employ the “observed value” method of Hanmer and Kalkan (2013) in these computations. Rather than setting
the other variables in the models to particular values (e.g., their means or modes), we allow them to vary naturally over
the observed values for every case in the data, then compute the average expected probability for each observed value
of Neighbors Adopting and Sources Adopting, respectively.
9Results with both included in the same model are substantively similar (see below).
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9, pooled model: 14) of Sources Adopting, the probability of adoption increases by the following
percentage points, on average: 24 (lotteries), 24 (Indian gaming), 50 (capital punishment), 16
(restaurant smoking bans), and 11 (pooled model). As with the effect of Neighbors Adopting, the
confidence intervals indicate varying degrees of uncertainty around these estimates.10 Nonetheless,
these graphs show that Sources Adopting exerts a substantively significant, positive impact on the
probability of adoption across many different policies.
Moreover, these positive effects remain even after controlling for Neighbors Adopting (see
below). In short, these replication results show that information from our policy diffusion network
can make a valuable contribution to diffusion studies. We show examples from four specific policy
areas and a 151-policy pooled model in which states utilize a persistent set of diffusion sources to
guide their policymaking decisions.
Marginal Effects with Neighbors and Sources
Figure A.5 presents the average marginal effects of Neighbors Adopting and Sources Adopting
on the expected probability of adoption, controlling for the other (i.e., from the models in column
3 of Table A.3). Note that results are substantively similar to those in Figure A.4, which presents
results from models with one variable or the other.
[Insert Figure A.5 here]
Replication Results with Percentage of Sources Adopting
Table A.4 presents the coefficient estimates and model fit statistics for the replication models
using the percentage of sources (rather than number of sources) adopting the policy as the indepen-
dent variable of interest. To maintain consistency we use the original authors’ operationalization
of the neighbors variable, which is a count in all but Shipan and Volden (2006). In an actual
analysis we recommend that researchers use the same operationalization (count or percentage) for
neighbors and sources.
Overall, these results are consistent with the results using the number of sources (see Table
10This is at least partially due to the fact that policy adoption models tend to have many independent variables (the
median is 19 in the four policy-specific replications).
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A.3): including the source variable in the model produces a positive (and often statistically signif-
icant) coefficient estimate and improves model fit.
[Insert Table A.4 here]
We do not for advocate one measure over the other, but rather defer to individual researchers
in making the choice based on theoretical and empirical considerations. The two approaches rep-
resent very different views on the diffusion process. The percentage measure specifies a diffusion
process where the non-adopting neighbors (sources) have just as much influence as the adopting
neighbors (sources) and the state ends up being pulled between the two. The count-based measure
assumes that non-adopting neighbors (sources) do not influence a state’s decision to adopt. If a
researcher thought that states are only affected by their sources who adopt a particular policy, the
count measure would likely make the most sense. In contrast, if states look to both their adopting
and non-adopting sources, the percentage-based measure may be more appropriate.
Fixed Effects Logit Results
Table A.5 presents results using a source and follower fixed-effects logit model. Overall, results
are consistent with those reported in the main text.
[Insert Table A.5 here]
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Figure A.1: BIC of the Pooled Discrete Time Event History Models
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Note: There are 187 policies and 65,885 observations in each model.
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Figure A.3: Mixture Model Fit
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Note: Different line shades correspond to different values of λ , the parameter that controls the entropy
in the initial cluster assignment probabilities.
xvii
Fi
gu
re
A
.4
:A
ve
ra
ge
M
ar
gi
na
lE
ff
ec
ts
of
N
ei
gh
bo
rs
A
do
pt
in
g
an
d
So
ur
ce
s
A
do
pt
in
g
(a
)N
ei
gh
bo
rs
,L
ot
te
ri
es
N
ei
gh
bo
rs
 A
do
pt
in
g 
Lo
tte
ry
Expected Probability of Adoption
l
l
l
l
l
0.
02
0.
04
0.
06
0.
09
0.
13
0
1
2
3
4
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
(b
)N
ei
gh
bo
rs
,I
nd
ia
n
G
am
in
g
N
ei
gh
bo
rs
 A
do
pt
in
g 
In
di
an
 G
am
in
g
Expected Probability of Adoption
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.
07
0.
11
0.
15
0.
21
0.
28
0.
36
0
1
2
3
4
5
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
(c
)N
ei
gh
bo
rs
,C
ap
ita
lP
un
is
hm
en
t
N
ei
gh
bo
rs
 A
do
pt
in
g 
Ca
pi
ta
l P
un
ish
m
en
t
Expected Probability of Adoption
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.
15
0.
18
0.
21
0.
25
0.
29
0.
33
0.
38
0.
42
0.
46
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
(d
)N
ei
gh
bo
rs
,S
m
ok
in
g
B
an
s
%
 N
ei
gh
bo
rs
 A
do
pt
in
g 
Sm
ok
in
g 
Ba
n
Expected Probability of Adoption
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.
03
0.
05
0.
07
0.
09
0.
13
0.
16
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
(e
)N
ei
gh
bo
rs
,P
oo
le
d
M
od
el
N
ei
gh
bo
rs
 A
do
pt
in
g 
Po
lic
y
Expected Probability of Adoption
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.
03
0.
04
0.
05
0.
06
0.
07
0.
08
0.
1
0.
12
0.
14
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
(f
)S
ou
rc
es
,L
ot
te
ri
es
So
ur
ce
s 
Ad
op
tin
g 
Lo
tte
ry
Expected Probability of Adoption
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
0.
06
0.
09
0.
13
0.
19
0.
25
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
(g
)S
ou
rc
es
,I
nd
ia
n
G
am
in
g
So
ur
ce
s 
Ad
op
tin
g 
In
di
an
 G
am
in
g
Expected Probability of Adoption
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.
07
0.
09
0.
13
0.
18
0.
24
0.
31
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
(h
)S
ou
rc
es
,C
ap
ita
lP
un
is
hm
en
t
So
ur
ce
s 
Ad
op
tin
g 
Ca
pi
ta
l P
un
ish
m
en
t
Expected Probability of Adoption
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.
09
0.
16
0.
25
0.
36
0.
48
0.
6
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
(i
)S
ou
rc
es
,S
m
ok
in
g
B
an
s
So
ur
ce
s 
Ad
op
tin
g 
Sm
ok
in
g 
Ba
n
Expected Probability of Adoption
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.
03
0.
05
0.
08
0.
11
0.
16
0.
19
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
(j
)S
ou
rc
es
,P
oo
le
d
M
od
el
So
ur
ce
s 
Ad
op
tin
g 
Po
lic
y
Expected Probability of Adoption
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.
03
0.
06
0.
1
0.
14
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
N
ot
e:
T
he
gr
ap
hs
pr
es
en
tt
he
av
er
ag
e
m
ar
gi
na
le
ff
ec
ts
of
N
ei
gh
bo
rs
A
do
pt
in
g
(t
op
ro
w
)a
nd
So
ur
ce
s
A
do
pt
in
g
(b
ot
to
m
ro
w
)i
n
th
e
fiv
e
re
pl
ic
at
io
n
m
od
el
s:
lo
tte
ri
es
(B
er
ry
an
d
B
er
ry
19
90
),
In
di
an
ga
m
in
g
(B
oe
hm
ke
20
05
),
ca
pi
ta
lp
un
is
hm
en
t(
B
oe
hm
ke
20
05
),
re
st
au
ra
nt
sm
ok
in
g
ba
ns
(S
hi
pa
n
an
d
Vo
ld
en
20
06
),
an
d
th
e
po
ol
ed
m
od
el
(B
oe
hm
ke
an
d
Sk
in
ne
r
20
12
).
Po
in
ts
re
pr
es
en
te
xp
ec
te
d
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
po
in
te
st
im
at
es
an
d
ve
rt
ic
al
lin
es
re
pr
es
en
t9
5%
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
te
rv
al
s.
xviii
Fi
gu
re
A
.5
:A
ve
ra
ge
M
ar
gi
na
lE
ff
ec
ts
of
N
ei
gh
bo
rs
A
do
pt
in
g
an
d
So
ur
ce
s
A
do
pt
in
g,
C
on
tr
ol
lin
g
fo
rt
he
O
th
er
(a
)N
ei
gh
bo
rs
,L
ot
te
ri
es
N
ei
gh
bo
rs
 A
do
pt
in
g 
Lo
tte
ry
Expected Probability of Adoption
l
l
l
l
l
0.
03
0.
04
0.
05
0.
06
0.
08
0
1
2
3
4
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
(b
)N
ei
gh
bo
rs
,I
nd
ia
n
G
am
in
g
N
ei
gh
bo
rs
 A
do
pt
in
g 
In
di
an
 G
am
in
g
Expected Probability of Adoption
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.
08
0.
12
0.
16
0.
22
0.
28
0.
35
0
1
2
3
4
5
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
(c
)N
ei
gh
bo
rs
,C
ap
ita
lP
un
is
hm
en
t
N
ei
gh
bo
rs
 A
do
pt
in
g 
Ca
pi
ta
l P
un
ish
m
en
t
Expected Probability of Adoption
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.
16
0.
18
0.
21
0.
23
0.
26
0.
29
0.
32
0.
35
0.
38
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
(d
)N
ei
gh
bo
rs
,S
m
ok
in
g
B
an
s
%
 N
ei
gh
bo
rs
 A
do
pt
in
g 
Sm
ok
in
g 
Ba
n
Expected Probability of Adoption
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.
04
0.
05
0.
06
0.
09
0.
12
0.
14
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
(e
)N
ei
gh
bo
rs
,P
oo
le
d
M
od
el
N
ei
gh
bo
rs
 A
do
pt
in
g 
Po
lic
y
Expected Probability of Adoption
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.
03
0.
04
0.
05
0.
06
0.
07
0.
08
0.
09
0.
1
0.
12
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
(f
)S
ou
rc
es
,L
ot
te
ri
es
So
ur
ce
s 
Ad
op
tin
g 
Lo
tte
ry
Expected Probability of Adoption
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
0.
05
0.
08
0.
11
0.
15
0.
2
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
(g
)S
ou
rc
es
,I
nd
ia
n
G
am
in
g
So
ur
ce
s 
Ad
op
tin
g 
In
di
an
 G
am
in
g
Expected Probability of Adoption
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.
07
0.
1
0.
14
0.
19
0.
25
0.
32
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
(h
)S
ou
rc
es
,C
ap
ita
lP
un
is
hm
en
t
So
ur
ce
s 
Ad
op
tin
g 
Ca
pi
ta
l P
un
ish
m
en
t
Expected Probability of Adoption
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.
1
0.
16
0.
25
0.
35
0.
47
0.
58
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
(i
)S
ou
rc
es
,S
m
ok
in
g
B
an
s
So
ur
ce
s 
Ad
op
tin
g 
Sm
ok
in
g 
Ba
n
Expected Probability of Adoption
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.
04
0.
05
0.
06
0.
09
0.
12
0.
14
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
(j
)S
ou
rc
es
,P
oo
le
d
M
od
el
So
ur
ce
s 
Ad
op
tin
g 
Po
lic
y
Expected Probability of Adoption
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
0.
04
0.
05
0.
06
0.
08
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
N
ot
e:
T
he
gr
ap
hs
pr
es
en
tt
he
av
er
ag
e
m
ar
gi
na
le
ff
ec
ts
of
N
ei
gh
bo
rs
A
do
pt
in
g
(t
op
ro
w
)a
nd
So
ur
ce
sA
do
pt
in
g
(b
ot
to
m
ro
w
),
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
fo
rt
he
ot
he
r,
in
th
e
fiv
e
re
pl
ic
at
io
n
m
od
el
s:
lo
tte
ri
es
(B
er
ry
an
d
B
er
ry
19
90
),
In
di
an
ga
m
in
g
(B
oe
hm
ke
20
05
),
ca
pi
ta
lp
un
is
hm
en
t(
B
oe
hm
ke
20
05
),
re
st
au
ra
nt
sm
ok
in
g
ba
ns
(S
hi
pa
n
an
d
Vo
ld
en
20
06
),
an
d
th
e
po
ol
ed
m
od
el
(B
oe
hm
ke
an
d
Sk
in
ne
r2
01
2)
.P
oi
nt
s
re
pr
es
en
te
xp
ec
te
d
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
po
in
te
st
im
at
es
an
d
ve
rt
ic
al
lin
es
re
pr
es
en
t9
5%
co
nfi
de
nc
e
in
te
rv
al
s.
Table A.1: Effect of Diffusion Ties on Emulation Stories, Adjusting for Total State Coverage
Estimate 2.5 %-tile 97.5%-tile
Intercept −6.712 −14.863 0.292
ln(1 + mean ties) 0.779 0.456 1.045
ln(1 + total coverage) 1.030 −0.005 2.240
R2 0.423
N 50
Note: OLS Regression coefficients reported with percentile bootstrap
confidence intervals constructed with 10,000 resampling iterations. The
dependent variable is ln(1+emulation stories).
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Table A.2: News Outlets Reporting Emulation Stories in LexisNexis
The Atlanta Journal-Constitution 11 The Tampa Tribune (Florida) 2
St. Louis Post-Dispatch 10 The Vancouver Sun (12 hour delay) 2
The Denver Post 10 Whittier Daily News (California) 2
Tampa Bay Times 9 Wisconsin State Journal 2
The Philadelphia Inquirer 9 American Banker 1
Deseret Morning News (Salt Lake City) 8 Clean Air Report 1
Lincoln Journal Star (Nebraska) 8 CongressNow 1
Providence Journal 8 Daily News (New York) 1
St. Paul Pioneer Press (Minnesota) 8 El Paso Times (Texas) 1
Omaha World Herald 7 Electric Power Daily 1
Portland Press Herald 7 Electric Utility Week 1
San Jose Mercury News (California) 7 Environmental Policy Alert 1
Tulsa World (Oklahoma) 7 Eureka Times-Standard (California) 1
The Palm Beach Post 6 Finance & Commerce (Minneapolis, MN) 1
The Record (Bergen County, NJ) 6 Global Power Report 1
Topeka Capital-Journal 6 guardian.co.uk 1
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 5 Idaho Falls Post Register 1
Contra Costa Times 4 Inside EPA Weekly Report 1
South Bend Tribune 4 Investor’s Business Daily 1
The Charleston Gazette 4 Legal News Line 1
The Salt Lake Tribune 4 Long Island Business News (Long Island, NY) 1
Discover America’s Story 3 Maryland Gazette 1
Herald News (Passaic County, NJ) 3 Michigan Lawyers Weekly 1
News-Journal (Daytona Beach, Florida) 3 Missouri Lawyers Media 1
Richmond Times Dispatch 3 Monterey County Herald (CA) 1
San Gabriel Valley Tribune (San Gabriel Valley, CA) 3 Nanaimo Daily News (12 hour delay) 1
Sarasota Herald-Tribune 3 National Post (12 hour delay) 1
The Austin American-Statesman 3 North Carolina Lawyers Weekly 1
The Bond Buyer 3 North Jersey Community Newspapers 1
The Capital (Annapolis, MD) 3 Ottawa Citizen (12 hour delay) 1
The Toronto Star 3 Pasadena Star-News (California) 1
The Union Leader 3 Pittsburgh Tribune Review 1
Bangor Daily News (Maine) 2 Platts Megawatt Daily 1
Brattleboro Reformer (Vermont) 2 Public Opinion (Chambersburg, Pennsylvania) 1
Charleston Daily Mail 2 Ruidoso News (New Mexico) 1
Chicago Daily Herald 2 San Bernardino Sun (California) 1
Crain’s Detroit Business 2 San Mateo County Times (San Mateo, CA) 1
Digital Archives 2 Star Tribune (Minneapolis MN) 1
Dolan Publications 2 Telegraph Herald (Dubuque, IA) 1
Information Bank Abstracts 2 The Baltimore Sun (most recent 6 months) 1
Inland Valley Daily Bulletin (Ontario, CA) 2 The Buffalo News (New York) 1
Inside Bay Area (California) 2 The Calgary Herald (12 hour delay) 1
Journal Record Legislative Report (Oklahoma City, OK) 2 The Capital Times (Madison, Wisconsin) 1
Legal Monitor Worldwide 2 The Columbian (Vancouver, WA) 1
McClatchy Tribune News non-restricted 2 The Decatur Daily (Alabama) 1
Metropolitan News Enterprise 2 The Gazette (12 hour delay) 1
Star-News (Wilmington, NC) 2 The Globe and Mail (Canada) 1
Telegram & Gazette (Massachusetts) 2 The Hamilton Spectator (Ontario, Canada) 1
The Berkshire Eagle (Pittsfield, Massachusetts) 2 The Hill 1
The Bismarck Tribune 2 The Indianapolis Business Journal 1
The Daily News of Los Angeles 2 The New York Post 1
The Daily Oklahoman (Oklahoma City, OK) 2 The Pantagraph 1
The Daily Record (Baltimore, MD) 2 The Patriot Ledger 1
The Florida Times Union 2 The Spokesman-Review 1
The Journal Record (Oklahoma City, OK) 2 The Straits Times (Singapore) 1
The Ledger (Lakeland) 2 The York Dispatch (York, PA) 1
The Santa Fe New Mexican 2 University Wire 1
The State Journal-Register (Springfield, IL) 2 Vallejo Times-Herald (California) 1
Note: Entries report news outlets and number of emulation stories identified in LexisNexis.
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Table A.3: Estimates and Model Fit Statistics for Neighbors Adopting and Sources Adopting in the
Replication Models
Only Neighbors Only Neighbors and
(Original Model) Sources Sources
Berry and Berry (1990): Lotteries (Probit, N = 857)
Neighbors Adopting 0.27∗ 0.16
(0.09) (0.10)
Sources Adopting 0.30∗ 0.25∗
(0.09) (0.10)
AIC 195.12 189.96 189.64
BIC 233.15 227.99 232.42
CV % Correctly Classified 94% 95% 95%
Boehmke (2005): Indian Gaming (Probit, N = 364)
Neighbors Adopting 0.42∗ 0.42∗
(0.20) (0.21)
Sources Adopting 0.20+ 0.21
(0.12) (0.13)
AIC 144.25 144.45 143.54
BIC 241.68 237.98 244.86
CV % Correctly Classified 89% 91% 90%
Boehmke (2005): Capital Punishment (Probit, N = 227)
Neighbors Adopting 0.16 0.14
(0.14) (0.14)
Sources Adopting 0.24∗ 0.23∗
(0.10) (0.10)
AIC 204.53 199.66 200.97
BIC 283.31 278.43 283.17
CV % Correctly Classified 75% 78% 76%
Shipan and Volden (2006): Restaurant Smoking Bans (Logit, N = 807)
% Neighbors Adopting 1.92∗ 1.66+
(0.86) (0.94)
Sources Adopting 0.25∗ 0.19
(0.12) (0.14)
AIC 248.57 249.96 249.16
BIC 328.36 329.75 333.64
CV % Correctly Classified 94% 93% 94%
151-Policy Pooled Model (Logit, N = 62,290)
Neighbors Adopting 0.22∗ 0.19∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Sources Adopting 0.13∗ 0.06∗
(0.02) (0.02)
AIC 17030.64 17089.78 17021.47
BIC 19263.41 19322.55 19263.28
CV % Correctly Classified 93% 93% 94%
Note: Cell entries report coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) for Neighbors Adopting and Sources
Adopting and AIC, BIC, and cross-validated percent correctly classified values in three specifications of the replication
models. All other variables from the original models are included, but those estimates are not shown to conserve space.
Numbers in bold identify the best-fitting model for each fit statistic. ∗ p< 0.05; + p< 0.10 (two-tailed).
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Table A.4: Estimates and Model Fit Statistics for Neighbors Adopting and Percentage of Sources
Adopting in the Replication Models
Only Neighbors Only Neighbors and
(Original Model) Sources Sources
Berry and Berry (1990): Lotteries (Probit, N = 857)
Neighbors Adopting 0.27∗ 0.20∗
(0.09) (0.10)
% Sources Adopting 1.57∗ 1.30∗
(0.52) (0.56)
AIC 195.12 193.22 191.41
BIC 233.15 231.25 234.20
CV % Correctly Classified 94% 95% 95%
Boehmke (2005): Indian Gaming (Probit, N = 364)
Neighbors Adopting 0.42∗ 0.42∗
(0.20) (0.20)
% Sources Adopting 1.10 1.04
(0.94) (0.94)
AIC 144.25 145.92 145.11
BIC 241.68 239.45 246.44
CV % Correctly Classified 89% 91% 89%
Boehmke (2005): Capital Punishment (Probit, N = 227)
Neighbors Adopting 0.16 0.15
(0.14) (0.14)
% Sources Adopting 2.15∗ 2.13∗
(0.77) (0.77)
AIC 204.53 197.84 198.81
BIC 283.31 276.62 281.01
CV % Correctly Classified 75% 76% 76%
Shipan and Volden (2006): Restaurant Smoking Bans (Logit, N = 807)
% Neighbors Adopting 1.92∗ 1.73
(0.86) (0.97)
% Sources Adopting 1.04 0.59
(0.85) (0.93)
AIC 248.57 250.89 249.87
BIC 328.36 330.50 334.17
CV % Correctly Classified 94% 93% 94%
151-Policy Pooled Model (Logit, N = 62,290)
Neighbors Adopting 0.22∗ 0.18∗
(0.02) (0.02)
% Sources Adopting 0.91∗ 0.54∗
(0.12) (0.13)
AIC 17030.64 17073.94 17011.82
BIC 19263.41 19306.71 19253.63
CV % Correctly Classified 93% 93% 94%
Note: Cell entries report coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) for Neighbors Adopting and % Sources
Adopting and AIC, BIC, and cross-validated percent correctly classified values in three specifications of the replication
models. All other variables from the original models are included, but those estimates are not shown to conserve space.
Numbers in bold identify the best-fitting model for each fit statistic. ∗ p< 0.05; + p< 0.10.
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Table A.5: Fixed Effects Logit Models of State Policy Diffusion Ties
Coef. S.E. Coef. S.E.
Follower State Characteristics:
Citizen Ideology −0.014∗ (0.002)
Legislative Professionalism −0.397 (0.244)
Minority Diversity 0.790+ (0.245)
Per Capita Income 0.699∗ (0.097)
Population 0.184+ (0.012)
Unified Democratic Government 0.011 (0.035)
Unified Republican Government −0.029 (0.041)
Potential Source Characteristics:
Citizen Ideology −0.007∗ (0.002)
Legislative Professionalism −0.133 (0.250)
Minority Diversity −0.147 (0.246)
Per Capita Income −0.037 (0.093)
Population 0.073∗ (0.014)
Unified Democratic Government −0.038 (0.035)
Unified Republican Government −0.075 (0.040)
Relative Follower/Source Characteristics:
Contiguity 0.149+ (0.039) 0.037 (0.040)
Distance Between Capitals −0.238∗ (0.021) −0.208+ (0.021)
Citizen Ideology (Absolute Difference) −0.009∗ (0.001)
Legislative Professionalism (Absolute Difference) 0.282+ (0.141)
Minority Diversity (Absolute Difference) −0.119 (0.107)
Per Capita Income (Absolute Difference) −0.428∗ (0.049)
Population (Absolute Difference) −0.035+ (0.004)
Unified Democratic (Product) 0.123+ (0.046)
Unified Republican (Product) −0.078 (0.083)
Intercept −3.611∗ (0.202) −3.133∗ (0.384)
N 94,080 94,080
AIC 62,821 62,048
Note: Observations are dyadic. The dependent variable indicates whether potential source state is in fact
a source for a follower state. We use the network with 300 edges over 35 years of policy adoptions. +
indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level (two-tailed) according to just the parametric p-values from
the multilevel logit. ∗ indicates statistical significance at the 0.05 level according to the QAP p-values and the
parametric p-values. QAP p-values derived from 1000 network permutations.
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